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Abstract  
This paper examines whether population shrinkage leads to changes in urban hierarchy in terms 
of their relative size and function from the standpoint of the new economic geography. We find 
some salient patterns in which small cities in the agglomeration shadow become relatively 
bigger as medium industries spill over on them. This appears to be quite robust against a 
variation in the rate of natural change among cities. Thus, rank-size relationship and the urban 
hierarchy are partly disrupted as population shrinks. Regarding the welfare of the residents, a 
lower demand for land initially causes rent to go down, which boosts the utility. However, the 
illusion is short-lived because markets soon begin to shrink and suppress wages. We also find 
that it is better to maintain a slow pace of overall population decline in the long-term 
perspective. More importantly, it is crucial to sustain the relative livability of smaller cities to 
minimize the overall loss of utility.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The population of Korea is expected to dwindle starting around 2030. In addition to a 
loss of economic vitality, the shrinking population would bring about a shortage of workforce 
and manpower as well as a skewed demography, resulting in low self-confidence and an 
overall reduced productivity. Also, the rising cost of care for the elderly and lower rates of 
investment from firms would deteriorate the quality of life in general. Its impact on the urban 
hierarchy of Korea is of particular interest. The Seoul National Capital Area occupies only 
11.8% of the entire land, yet it accommodates 24.5 million inhabitants, almost half of the 
country’s population. Understandably, the Korean government has been obsessed with the idea 
of a decentralization of industry and a balanced growth of regions. Through myriads of laws 
and regulations, the central authority tried hard to drive out firms and people by inducing them 
to non-capital areas with favorable environments.  
Other smaller cities are worth looking into. Busan is Korea’s second largest metropolis, 
with a population of around 3.5 million. It is the largest port city in Korea and the fifth busiest 
seaport in the world. Incheon became important because of its location which made it a good 
harbor; when the port was founded in 1883, the city had a population of only 4,700. Incheon is 
now home to over 2.5 million people. Daegu is the city of the manufacturing industry. 
Remarkable manufacturing factories such as Samsung are located near the city. Being known 
as the Silicon Valley of Korea, Daejeon is home to various private and public research 
institutes, centers and science parks. The mutual stimulation and cooperation between these 
communities produce remarkable innovation and commercialization of technologies. Ulsan is 
the industrial powerhouse, which is home to the world’s largest automobile assembly plant, 
shipyard and oil refinery. In 2008, Ulsan had a GDP per capita of $63,817, the highest by far in 
Korea. Although these cities seem to be thriving for now, it is quite uncertain how they would 
fare in an era of diminishing population and expectations. 
There have been many regional development polices since the 1970s, an era of fast 
growth. One important aspect that has been found consistently in these policies is that they all 
aimed for regional equity; regional development policy meant a balanced regional 
development policy in Korea. Regional disparity was discussed in the framework of capital vs. 
non-capital areas, and many measures were taken to reduce the gap. Such measures include 
constructing SOC in underdeveloped regions, providing incentives for firms in the capital area 
to relocate to non-capital regions, building up and subsidizing industry bases in 
underdeveloped regions, controlling the expansion of the capital area, and so on. Thus, Korea’s 
regional development policy is synonymous with the growth management of SNCA.  
This study aims at eliciting the consequences of an impending population shrinkage on 
the social and economic aspects of an economy, especially a systematic analysis of its spatial 
implication. Given a huge concentration of population in the capital area, it would be a 
meaningful task to investigate the potential outcome of a decreasing population in the city 
systems of Korea or any other country facing a similar problem. 
Previous literature is generally silent about the effects of a negative external shock in 
terms of population. It is uncertain, for example, whether there would be a system wide 
reduction of population across the board or a disappearance of smaller cities with primary city 
becoming larger, or vice versa. In any case, the underlying mechanism of agglomeration, as 
empirically identified by Rosenthal and Strange (2001), would now start working backwards 
so that all knowledge spillovers, labor market pooling, and input sharing are reduced. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the recent 
phenomena of population shrinkage. Section 3 reviews the related literature. Section 4 
describes the model structure. Section 5 presents the simulation results, and section 6 
concludes the paper. 
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2. Population shrinkage 
 
According to the United Nations, the world population reached 7 billion in October 
2011, and they estimate that there will be 9.3 billion by 2050. As a baby boom generation 
enters the labor force, a country can enjoy a demographic dividend with a rising income and a 
low dependency ratio. As that generation retires, however, the dividend turns to a liability with 
population growth stagnant or falling.  
 Figure 1 illustrates total fertility by major regions. The fertility rate is the number of 
children an average woman is likely to have during her childbearing years of 15-49. In general, 
2.1 is considered the replacement level of fertility, allowing for early mortality. By 2020, the 
global fertility rate will dip below the global replacement rate for the first time. The world’s 
population will stabilize at 9.2 billion in 2050. Wealth and fertility go together negatively. Low 
fertility enables rapid accumulation of capital per head. A shortage of workers, however, 
eventually pushes up wage costs.  
Figure 2 shows the population figures for Japan and Korea. Japan, once called the lead 
goose, is now the oldest goose. Japan is the fastest aging society and the first big country in 
history to have started shrinking rapidly from natural causes. In the 2005 census, the number of 
deaths exceeded that of births for the first time. The working age population hit its highest 
point in 1995, and by 2050 it will be smaller than it was in 1950. Employment rates among 
women have increased, and private companies discourage mothers from returning to their old 
jobs.1 What took place in Britain over 130 years (1800-1930) took place in Korea over just 20 
years (1965-1985).2
 Women get married later or don’t get married at all. Marriages are also breaking down, 
which is a recent change in Asia. Some blame the improvements in women’s education and 
income. In Korea women earn half of all the master’s degrees. More education leaves the best-
educated women with fewer potential partners. In Korea the employment rate of women in 
their 20s (59.2%) overtook that of men (58.5%). The collapse of lifetime employment systems 
in Japan and Korea means that the wife’s earnings are needed. They put off having children 
while they pursue a career. They are faced with an unwelcomed choice between a career and a 
family. The best-educated and highest-paid women face great opportunity cost of having 
children. Park (2006) surmised that the high costs of education for children and the increasing 
labor participation of women were decisive in lowering the fertility rate of Korean women. In 
China, 118 boys were born to every 100 girls due to sex-selective abortions. In 2030 about 8% 
of Chinese men aged 25 and older will be unable to marry.
 The total fertility rate of Korea was at a record low of 1.15 in 2009, the 
lowest in OECD countries and well below the replacement level. 
3
 What would happen to cities when their population implodes? According to Nakajima 
(2008), the separation of Japan and Korea brought a negative effect, more so on smaller cities 
than on larger cities. Border cities in Japan suffered a greater decline due to the loss of 
accessibility to the colonial markets, causing a subsequent relocation of industry and people. 
From a theoretical standpoint, Holmes (1999) explained that in the standard economic 
geography model, the equilibrium output of a particular variant is independent of population. 
When the elasticity of substitution is low, as population increases, total local production 
expands not only by adding new varieties but also by increasing the output of existing products. 
Thus, there might be a convex relationship between local production and population.  
  
 
                                                          
1 “Into the unknown: A special report on Japan”, The Economist, November 20, 2010. 
2 “Go forth and multiply a lot less”, The Economist, October 31, 2009. 
3 “The flight from marriage”, The Economist, August 20, 2011. 
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3. Review of the Literature 
What happens to an urban system when its population decreases is not so well 
documented. An insight to this question can be gained from Fujita et al. (1999). Given that the 
cities within an economy constitute some form of hierarchical structure, they model the 
endogenous formation of a hierarchical urban system. To overcome the multiplicity of 
equilibria, they propose an evolutionary approach which combines a general equilibrium 
model with an adjustment dynamic. It is shown that as the economy’s population size 
gradually increases, the urban system self-organizes into a highly regular hierarchical system.  
More specifically, they consider a spatial economy in which the agglomeration force is 
generated through product variety in manufactured goods, while the expansion of the 
agricultural hinterland induces a dispersion of the location of manufacturing production. It is 
demonstrated that when the economy contains multiple groups of manufactured goods with 
different degrees of product differentiation and different transport costs, as the population size 
increases, a hierarchical urban system emerges.  
This section provides a comprehensive review of the related literature including rank-
size rule and central place theory. As we shall see, it was not until the new economic 
geography came about that a comprehensive framework under the microeconomic 
underpinnings was developed with a full-fledged general equilibrium model.  
 
3.1 Rank-size rule 
 
Urban economics handles the internal structure of cities. Theories dealing with multiple 
cities are concerned with either their size or industrial mix. In “a report of failure,” Krugman 
(1996) noted that we have complex, messy models, yet the reality is startlingly neat and simple. 
In particular, the size distribution follows a power law. While debatable, we can find 
remarkable regularity in many social phenomena. It is called Pareto or power law distribution. 
A fairly ostensible tendency is maintained. Basically, the probability a firm is larger than size s 
is inversely proportional to s. It is robustly held for firm sizes, as shown by Axtell (2001) using 
the entire population of US firms. 
 Zipf (1949) showed that the logarithm of the population size of a city is a linear 
function of the logarithm of its rank in the urban hierarchy. While, Zipf’s Law is probabilistic, 
rank-size rule is deterministic. Gibrat’s law can lead to Pareto distribution, and to test it 
requires growth rate data for cities. Córdoba (2008) pointed out that most urban models, 
having a deterministic character, failed to match the salient evidence. Most studies are 
descriptive, focusing on size distribution with little consideration for functional differences. 
Beckmann (1958) showed that rank size rule is compatible with the ideas of urban hierarchy 
only under restrictive assumptions on the population size and the number of satellite cities. 
Parr (1985) argued that the entire analysis depends on whether the city proper or metropolitan 
areas are used. This seems particularly sensitive to the lower city size cut-off.  
The temporal variation within a country shows that increased concentration is followed 
by a mild tendency toward a decreased concentration. Using a comprehensive database of 
world cities, Pumain (1997) found that the parameter is 1.05. More importantly, it is 
independent of the level of development. From this observation, one can allude that size 
distribution will be preserved when a population shrinks, even though their functions may go 
through substantial changes.  
Davis and Weinstein (2002) focused on the resilience of the Japanese cities devastated 
by the allied bombing during World War II. Showing mean reversion, relative city sizes were 
recovered within 15 years. Following their footsteps, Brakman et al. (2004) found the massive 
bombing campaign of German cities, which had a similar magnitude with Japan’s, only 
temporarily affected their post-war growth. 
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 Rosen and Resnick (1980) found that cities in 44 countries are more evenly distributed 
than would be predicted by the rank-size rule, but are sensitive to the definition of the city and 
sample size. Soo (2005) updated this with a larger sample of 73 countries. Over half exhibit 
values significantly greater than 1, which is consistent with Rosen and Resnick, especially for 
European countries. The values significantly less than 1 reflect increasing suburbanization in 
large cities. It is better explained by political economy variables like dictatorship than by 
economic geography variables such as scale economies and transport costs. This may have 
resulted because NEG theory is not stochastic in nature. 
 Eaton and Eckstein (1997) showed that similar growth rates across cities of different 
sizes lead to their parallel growth. The relative populations of the urban areas of France and 
Japan remained constant during their periods of industrialization. They further developed a 
model for urban growth based on the accumulation of human capital. Black and Henderson 
(2003) demonstrated that the US cities have shown a fairly stable relative size distribution 
throughout the 20th century, where the transition of cities through the distribution was 
stationary. 
Gabaix (1999) is considered, by many, a breakthrough with good economic contents. It 
uses an overlapping generations model in which consumers choose a location when they are 
young, following production shocks. It leads to Gibrat’s law where the growth of a city is 
independent of its size, implying Zipf’s law when in a steady state. He demonstrated that 
Zipf’s Law is an outcome of Gibrat’s Law, a stochastic process in which growth rates are 
uncorrelated with city sizes.  
Duranton (2006) provided an endogenous growth model based on innovation 
expanding product variety, which generates Zipf’s distribution for cities, but neither functional 
differences nor hierarchical order can be found. Duranton (2007) is then critical on the works 
of Gabaix (1999), Córdoba (2003), Eeckhout (2004), as well as Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 
(2007) for being driven by some kind of ad hoc exogenous shocks. Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 
(2007) introduced productivity shocks. These cities specialize in only one industry and the 
number of cities is endogenous. Eeckhout (2004) showed that the size distribution is lognormal 
when the data are not cut off at an arbitrary rank. Using the very same data, Berliant and 
Watanabe (2008) built yet another model based on household hedging against a city-wide 
productivity shock by insurance rather than moving to other cities. There exists quite a rich 
body of literature on this subject, but it is seldom based on microfoundation. Most models 
trying to explain, mimic or reproduce were in vain. 
  
3.2 Central place theory 
 
The monocentric city of Thünen (1826) is a general equilibrium on concentric rings. 
The power of the model was elegantly elaborated by Samuelson (1983). It led to modern urban 
economics under the framework of a monocentric city with the central business district. 
Another strand of theory dealing with multiple cities focuses on a hierarchical structure in their 
industrial composition. Christaller (1933) conceptualized lattices of nested hexagons that lead 
to a locational equilibrium. Larger centers are functionally more complex and interdependent 
in the provision of goods. A number of empirical studies, including Berry and Garrison (1958), 
tried to verify these concepts. 
Perhaps the first crude economic modeling of central places, albeit rudimentary, was 
offered by Eaton and Lipsey (1982) through the maximizing behavior of buyers and sellers. It 
meets the hierarchical principle where any goods supplied in a central place is also supplied in 
all central places of lower order. Henderson (1974) is usually credited with the formal 
treatment of formation and the optimal size of specialized cities under a multiple city setting, 
through external economies from agglomeration and diseconomies stemming from the need to 
commute. The key is that external economies are specific to particular industries, while 
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diseconomies depend on the size of the city. However, this was criticized by Fujita et al. (1999) 
for its aspatial nature, where intercity relationships and distances are not spelled out.  
 Dobkins and Ioannides (2001) argued that central place theory says nothing about the 
location of US cities, also where new cities appear cannot be addressed by Henderson’s model. 
The same group of cities grew in parallel because the US expanded in terms of both population 
and the number of cities, while new cities were spawned. They found evidence for an 
agglomeration shadow, but no significant correlation between functional order and the date of 
settlement. The largest cities are not necessarily tier-one. In addition, tier-one cities are not 
necessarily the farthest apart. 
Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1993) discussed conditions for specialization and 
diversification, but only two goods were traded with no transport cost. As a city equals a firm, 
it is impossible to analyze a hierarchy. Abdel-Rahman (1994) extended the above model with a 
consideration for intermediate goods, but also admitted that there is no spatial configuration of 
cities nor friction. Later, Duranton and Puga (2001) focused on the functional differences 
between specialized and diversified cities. These can partly explain the formation of an urban 
hierarchy. Anas and Xiong (2003) further showed that population growth favors diversification 
by modeling the trade of differentiated intermediate goods among cities.  
Henderson (1997) observed that city size distributions are stable over time. More 
importantly, medium size cities of many countries are highly specialized in manufacturing 
activities in particular sectors, exhibiting localization economies. Ioannides (1994) provided an 
urban growth model with an overlapping generation, but it still lacked transport costs between 
cities. Prior to New Economic Geography, it seems fair to say that no intercity transport costs 
were considered while the main focus was on the transport costs within a city. Product 
differentiation drives population growth, yet each city houses a single firm. It then reaches a 
rather unrealistic conclusion that utility and the number of cities increase exponentially. Wang 
(1999) built a spatial model of a central place system in a two-dimensional space with 
transport costs and two industrial goods. But there were neither differentiated products nor 
increasing returns at firm level. It merely managed to replicate static equilibrium configuration 
with no interesting dynamics. 
 Mori et al. (2007) developed a useful concept called the Number-Average Size Rule. It 
says a strong negative log-linear relation exists between the number and the average size of 
areas in which a given industry is found. The set of industries found in a smaller city is a 
subset of what is found in a larger city. The industries with a smaller number of locations are 
found in MEAs with a large industrial diversity. MEAs with a small industrial diversity have 
more ubiquitous industries. Based on observation, they suggested that MEAs should focus on 
attracting the lower-order industries that can stimulate regional growth given that there is a 
critical size of MEA for each industry. Although it ignores the size of the industry present in a 
given area, it still captures the linkage between regularities found in the rank-size rule and 
Christaller’s hierarchy principle. Hsu (2008) demonstrated that the NAS holds for the US. 
 
3.3 New Economic Geography 
 
An early attempt to analyze urban structures by Camagni et al. (1986) accommodated 
economic forces, location benefits and innovations of new production, along with a stochastic 
process which generated bifurcations in the historical path of the urban centers. Rivera-Batiz 
(1988) did more early work. The monopolistically-competitive service sector generates 
agglomeration economies in both production and consumption. He also considered 
endogenous allocation of population through migration among a system of cities, giving rise to 
varying city sizes. However, no tensions were found among multiple regions through the trade 
of goods. 
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 Fujita (1988) sowed the seed for analyzing the spatial structure of a city using 
monopolistic competition. It focused on the emergence of an urban center through the 
agglomeration of firms and consumers. Concentration occurs when economies of scale are 
large enough compared to transport costs and enough production is mobile. Households make 
trips to purchase goods. However, the model does not allow for varying transport costs, and a 
centrifugal force is missing. Krugman (2009) is also critical about this model because the 
goods were completely nontradable.  
In his seminal paper, Krugman (1991) envisioned two regions, two sectors, and two 
types of workers. It is often likened to Ricardian model of international trade theory. 
Consumers consume a variety of manufactured goods each produced by a single firm. 
Homogeneous agricultural goods are produced by immobile farmers with a constant return and 
acts as a centrifugal force. Goods are melted away en route. There is a tug-of-war between 
forward and backward linkages against farmers. In addition, there are pecuniary externalities 
associated with demand and supply linkages. Suppose there is slightly more population in one 
region. If transport costs fall, it ends up gaining in population. The wage rate tends to be higher 
due to the home market effect, but workers in a smaller region face less competition. In 
addition, workers in the larger region pay lower prices for manufactured goods. The 
manufacturers concentrate on areas where there is a large market, which is large when there 
are many workers consuming goods. In addition to this, the workers move to large production 
centers where cheap products are available.  
There are three forces at work. Namely, the market-access (backward) effect means 
that firms would locate in large markets to export to smaller markets. The cost-of-living 
(forward) effect is destabilizing; goods are cheaper where there are many firms because 
consumers import a narrow range of goods to avoid trade costs. The market-crowding (local 
competition) effect favors dispersion as firms show a preference towards locations possessing 
fewer potential competitors. We have tension between these effects. If the agglomeration 
effects are stronger, a migration shock triggers a self-reinforcing cycle, otherwise the 
symmetric equilibrium is stable. This line of reasoning has made significant inroads, and its 
shortcomings are being rectified over time. For instance, Baldwin et al. (2003) raised concern 
about the myopic behavior of migrants and attempted to correct this by augmenting it with 
forward-looking expectations. 
The result hinges upon centripetal and centrifugal forces; the three-way interaction 
among increasing returns, transport costs, and mobile factors that lead to an equilibrium. 
Preference for product variety facilitates agglomeration. In the words of Krugman (1998), 
“firms want to concentrate production (because of scale economies) near markets and suppliers 
(because of transport costs); but access to markets and suppliers is best where other firms 
locate (because of market-size effects).” The centrifugal force is generated by the immobility 
of agriculture. Kim (1995) concluded that regional specialization in the US reached its peak 
during the interwar years before falling continuously. It casts doubts on whether external 
economies from increasing returns became more important. Krugman (2009) partly concurs 
with this view but argues that geography is still important.  
Actually, Krugman (1979, 1980) already had major elements and some basic 
ingredients of NEG in his early work on new trade theory, save for trade costs, mobile factors, 
dynamic process, bifurcation, and explicit centrifugal force. He developed the new trade theory 
to explain intra-industry trade. Apart from migration, the core-periphery model is very close to 
the model proposed by Krugman (1980). The iceberg transport costs and home market effects 
are also mentioned in that paper.  
Regarding agglomeration economies: Marshall (1890) noted a tendency for firms to 
cluster together; Chamberlin (1933) proposed monopolistic competition; Samuelson (1954) 
devised the iceberg transport cost; David (1985) showed many phenomena that are locked in 
by historical accidents or a particular sequencing of choices made at the beginning of the 
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process; Arthur (1987) also had a vague sense of lock-in effects such as chance events, 
coincidences and circumstances in the past that together determine the shape of urban systems. 
Matsuyama (1995) described the success of the Dixit–Stiglitz model of monopolistic 
competition in various economic fields. The monopolistic competition possesses distinct 
advantages. It can focus on aggregate implications of increasing returns without worrying 
about any strategic interactions. The range of products in the market can be endogenized 
through entry and exit, thus it can thus show growth through cumulative processes. Myrdal 
(1957) developed the notion of cumulative causation by saying “… beyond a certain stage of 
development – the thresholds - … [localized growth centers] acquire strong self-perpetuating 
momentum through derived advantages of their early growth.”  
Fujita and Thisse (2009) recognize that Krugman showed how an arbitrarily small 
difference between regions can lead to an agglomeration of manufacturing. It relies only on 
market interactions without appealing to externality of some kind. The transport costs play a 
key role. Boschma and Lambooy (1999) argued that the inertia or negative lock-in of path-
dependency may cause difficulties for regions to adapt to new technology. Grabher (1993) 
described regions as locked into the legacy of their industrial past. 
 Helpman (1995) replaced agriculture with non-tradable housing services as a dispersion 
force and, although intuitively less appealing than Krugman’s theory, obtained a result which 
revealed that low transport costs lead to dispersion and high transport costs lead to 
agglomeration. Tabuchi and Thisse (2006) focused on urban costs such as housing and 
commuting for dispersion forces. It disregarded the agriculture sector, and used two industries 
to generate an urban hierarchy. The larger region has a larger share of each industry and has 
more variety of both goods. The improvements in intraregional transport technologies induce a 
catastrophic transition from dispersion to agglomeration. Tabuchi et al. (2005) built a 
multiregional model with congestion costs. As transport costs decrease, large cities attract 
firms and workers from the shrinking smaller cities. When there are intermediate values, 
medium cities shrink while large and small cities grow. When the values are small, large cities 
shrink while small cities grow. The rural-urban flows rise, followed by urban-rural flows. 
 Baldwin and Forslid (2000) argued that integration accompanied by the lower cost of 
trading ideas and knowledge spillovers act as a centrifugal and stabilizing force. Fujita and 
Thisse (2003) built a two-region endogenous growth model. The R&D sector creates new 
varieties, and the population is fixed. Agglomeration generates more growth making everyone 
better off, but the gap between the core and the periphery enlarges. 
 Fujita and Krugman (1995) looked for a parameter range within which a monocentric 
equilibrium exists, using the concept of market potential under monopolistic competition. Now 
goods are tradable and transport costs are introduced. As the population increases, welfare of 
all of the workers and landlords also increase. Fujita and Mori (1997) showed how a 
monocentric city evolves into a multicity system as the population increases. Soon a number of 
variants along this line of work proliferated. 
 Mori (1997) showed how falling transport costs for manufactures led to the formation 
of a megalopolis with large core cities connected by an industrial belt. This reconciled 
disparity with salient empirical evidence negating agglomeration shadow. It used the potential 
function to get around the fact that cities in NEG models are represented by a point in space. 
The equilibrium fringe distance is an increasing function of population, that causes a deviation 
of firms from their existing city. When the population distribution is perturbed between the 
two cities, a new city can be created. 
 Fujita and Mori (1996) simulated the hub effect by showing that market potential is 
kinked at the port and hits a local peak at geographically advantageous locations. This explains 
the first nature advantages of non-uniform geographical space. The first nature refers to 
geographical features intrinsic to the site, while the second nature depends on the interactions 
among economic agents. Equilibrium fringe distance is an increasing function of the 
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population size. The port cities tend to prosper even after their initial advantage becomes 
irrelevant. Because of inertia, lock-in effects call on a self-reinforcing agglomeration. With 
several groups of manufactured goods, a hierarchical decentralization appears where lower 
order industries spin out first.  
 The models above extended the horizon of the original core-periphery model to the real 
line. More attempts have been made to verify major concepts of NEG, and the results are 
mixed. Some focus on population increase and not so much on transport costs. Fujita and 
Hamaguchi (2001) postulated a homogeneous manufacturing sector which used a variety of 
intermediate goods. They utilized the potential function for intermediate goods to depict a 
situation where the intermediate goods sector is concentrated but the manufacturing sector may 
not. Furthermore, a primacy trap can arise where population growth cannot lead to the 
formation of new cities and only decreases the welfare of workers in an expanding metropolis. 
This explains the dominance of inefficient primate cities in many developing countries. Fujita 
and Krugman (1995), in contrast, revealed that the welfare of workers is commensurate with 
population growth.  
 With a finite number of regions, Starrett’s (1978) Spatial Impossibility Theorem 
dictates that the competitive market mechanism breaks down when the mobility of firms and 
households are combined with the transport costs of goods, thus necessitating some forms of 
imperfect competition to handle regional issues. Hence, production activities were spread out 
over space reducing transport costs to zero. Behrens and Thisse (2007) “provides a full-fledged 
general equilibrium approach with strong microeconomic underpinnings in which regional 
disparities may or may not emerge endogenously, depending on the values of some structural 
parameters.”  
 David (1999) pointed out that in the process to explain a set of stylized facts through 
deterministic mathematical modeling, NEG may reinforce a tendency to suppress details on 
heterogeneous nature in actual geography. Boschma and Frenken (2006) observed changes 
made after neoclassical economics re-entered the arena. It naturally met harsh resistance from 
many fronts. Neoclassical economists renewed their interest in geography while geographers 
were moving away from economics. With increasing returns at the firm level and imperfect 
competition, utility maximization and representative agents, agglomeration can occur without 
regional differences and local specificity such as culture and institutions. As transport costs fall, 
firms and workers find it profitable to cluster. 
 NEG models tend to focus on the effects of decreasing spatial friction and changes in 
the distributions of economic activities thereof. Anas (2004) argued that NEG has drawbacks. 
Namely, it neglects normative issues and internal urban structure. More importantly, by 
assuming that all goods are unique and that consumers are hungry for variety, it exaggerates 
the importance of trade among cities. This is caused by the extreme taste for variety of the 
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type. Krugman (2009) admits resorting to the Dixit-Stiglitz model for the 
sake of tractability, despite its unrealistic assumptions. The merits and shortcomings such as 
preferences for variety, internal economies of scale, free entry and exit, and no strategic 
interactions are all carried over to new economic geography. The home market effect leads the 
larger region to export the manufactured goods. This is pecuniary externality because 
migration of workers affects the welfare of the remaining workers and the attractiveness of 
both regions.  
Krugman (1993a) envisioned the emergence of a metropolis as a self-reinforcing 
second nature takes over. A variety of urban goods provide forward linkage while demand for 
manufactured goods produce backward linkage. With the incentive to move away from the city 
aiming for the rural market, a tug-of-war is aptly captured. Using cumulative causation, 
Krugman (1993b) showed a random allocation of workers in some prespecified locations can 
converge to a roughly central place pattern through a reinforcement of initial advantages. The 
model also demonstrated an agglomeration shadow. Fujita et al. (1999) managed to show that 
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as a population increases, a more or less regular hierarchical central place system emerges, 
with trade between cities. It formalizes the role of agglomeration in the dynamic formation of 
an urban system. There are symbiotic interrelationships among tiers. We have agglomeration 
shadows preventing urban areas from forming too closely to each other. It is able to produce 
only those goods not in direct competition with the higher tiered centers nearby. It is quite 
intriguing to investigate how population shrinkage would manifest itself in this kind of setting. 
 Tabuchi and Thisse (2011) show how a hierarchical system could emerge in a circular 
multi-location space as transport costs decrease. The number, size, and location of cities are 
endogenously determined. Small cities gradually lose their jobs and industries. Large cities 
supply more goods and a wider range of variety. However, no attempt is made to provide 
microeconomic foundations to the Zipf’s Law; as such, rank-size rule is not considered. We 
have a short-run equilibrium in which firms choose prices and consumers choose consumption, 
taking the amount of workers in each region as given. In the long-run equilibrium, workers 
choose simultaneously where to live and which sector to take a job. Workers are attracted to 
cities where many varieties are available, and repelled by places where there are many workers 
this depresses the local labor market. Firms are attracted to places with many consumers and 
repelled by many local competitors.  
 
3.4 Empirical research on NEG 
 
Geography matters because it exerts strong influence on human settlements. Showing 
that two Canadian provinces trade twenty times more than a US state would with a Canadian 
province, McCallum (1995) maintained that national borders still matter for trade. Then it 
would be even more so for the movement of workers.  
Fujita and Tabuchi (1997) pointed out that a renewed tendency toward core-periphery 
formation is accentuated by developments in telecommunications and transportation 
technologies. The knowledge-intensive activities in core regions for face-to-face contacts go 
hand in hand with mass-production activities in peripheral regions. 
 Various attempts have been made to verify some of the major concepts of NEG with 
limited success. Wild and Jones (1994) found an enlarged economic gulf following the 
unification of Germany. The migration of East German workers, especially young with 
industrial skills, into West Germany offered a compelling testament on diverging effect of 
reduced spatial friction which results in agglomeration; they were just looking for employment 
opportunities and a higher wage. 
Other empirical studies check various facets of NEG. Davis and Weinstein (1999) 
confirmed the existence of home market effects for the manufacturing sectors in the Japanese 
prefectures. The demand moved supply more than proportionately. In line with McCallum 
(1995), there are lower interregional trade costs and a greater degree of factor mobility across 
the regions. Davis and Weinstein (2003) also found some degree of home market effects from 
increasing returns for OECD countries. Hanson (2005) used 3,075 US counties to detect a 
correlation between wages and consumer purchasing power in the surrounding locations. The 
wages decrease with transport costs to these locations. 
 Using cross-country data, Redding and Venables (2004) showed the access to markets 
and sources of supply do affect the variation in per capita income. Their study differs from 
Hanson (1998) in that countries were used, suppliers were considered, and labor was immobile. 
The results were not at odds with theory, however. Wage isn’t everything, and one has to 
control for amenities and rent. Graves and Mueser (1993) cautioned that, for one thing, if 
workers were being compensated in the form of higher wages for disamenities, one would 
observe movement toward low-income locations. 
 Rappaport and Sachs (2003) indeed found economic activity overwhelmingly 
concentrated near ocean and Great Lakes. A contribution from coastal proximity to 
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productivity and quality of life does exist. The 559 counties with centers within 80km of an 
ocean or Great Lakes account for 13% of the continental US land area but 51% of the 
population and 57% of civilian income. It tends to confirm the notion of compensating 
differential. A high income may reflect a high underlying productivity or compensation for an 
undesirable quality of life such as unpleasant weather or pollution. Glaeser et al. (2001) also 
provided a strong positive relationship between amenity value and population growth in US 
cities. 
 Brakman et al. (2006) stressed that, in line with core-periphery model, empirical 
studies tend to focus on simulating the impact of trade liberalization that is expected with 
decreasing transport costs. Hadar and Pines (2004) examined how an increase of aggregate 
population size affects a population partition between two cities. It is shown to critically 
depend on the relationship between housing and differentiated goods. Bosker et al. (2010) 
further expanded the horizon to accommodate heterogeneous multi-region setting. 
Partridge et al. (2009) found little evidence on growth shadows in an established 
mature urban system. Large urban centers render positive growth effects for small centers 
nearby, possibly due to commuting and input-output externalities outside the city border. The 
largest centers cast shadows on medium-sized metropolitan areas, and they postulate shadows 
that are overcome by positive spillovers. Mori et al. (2005) confirmed the presence of an 
agglomeration shadow by showing that the distance between neighboring agglomerations of 
the same industry is larger than it would be under a randomly generated spatial configuration. 
Kojima (1996) chronicled adoption in the 1960s and recent breakdown of restriction on 
the population movement in China. Ma and Fan (1994) found that since the market reforms in 
China, freer migration fueled the growth of towns in their numbers, size, and industrial 
structure. Au and Henderson (2006) pointed out that Chinese restrictions on not only rural-
urban migration but also on intra-sector migration led to economic inefficiency from under-
agglomeration. The early 1990s saw rapid pro-competition reforms and economic growth 
which led to a dramatic shake up of the urban system. In the same vein, Tabuchi (1987) 
showed that in postwar Japan, income differential caused interregional migration, not the other 
way around. 
As Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004) showed, the cost of moving goods has fallen 
sufficiently due to a revolution of transportation technologies, and there is little reason to 
predict any further decline. Specifically, the average cost of moving a ton a mile in 1890 was 
18.5 cents, as opposed to only 2.3 cents today (in 2001 dollars), while trucking costs have 
fallen 2% per year since 1980. Given the existing infrastructure already in place, there is even 
less reason to surmise this trend will be reversed.  
Considering transport costs have been decreasing overall, spatial friction within a 
country is, and probably will remain, at a very low level. Recognizing export possibility to 
nearby locations, Head and Mayer (2004) examined location choices of Japanese firms in 
Europe through market potential in each district. There exist trade impediments. More 
importantly, the location of competitors is taken into account. Assuming fixed costs do not 
differ across locations, and considering distance, borders, and language difference, they found 
market potential does matter. This matches NEG theory to a considerable degree. 
 Head and Mayer (2006) tested home market effect in a European context using 13 
industries and 57 regions. The wages respond to differentials in the market potential of export 
possibilities of firms located in the given region. Forslid et al. (2002) checked the validity of 
NEG prediction by simulating many regions and many industry cases for Europe. Economic 
integration leads to a concentration of industries. With trade liberalization, industries with 
increasing returns and intra-industry linkages demonstrate a higher concentration for 
intermediate trade costs. 
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4. Model 
 
We work backwards in a racetrack economy with eight cities. Distribution of 
population is chosen to satisfy both the rank-size rule and the central place hierarchy. The 
economy is in a long-run equilibrium in which the utility levels are the same everywhere. We 
are interested in the changes in population, rank, and hierarchy. We first build a model that 
explains the current establishment of urban systems in an economy. Second, under different 
scenarios, we check whether and how the order of disappearance changes when the general 
population begins to shrink. Finally, we explore the policy implications for minimizing the loss 
of efficiency and social welfare. 
Heikkila and Wang (2009) utilize the Fujita and Ogawa (1982) model to explain the 
emergence of urban centers through the location decisions of firms and households in the 
context of differentiated labor and land market interactions. The outcomes depend on the 
bidding behavior of agents. Fujita et al. (1999) imagined an economy with existing cities, and 
allowed its population to grow steadily. They then considered when and where new cities 
would emerge, using a dynamic adjustment process for the location of urban industries and 
their workers. This evolutionary approach offers a perspective on how economies evolve in 
space in terms of the coevolution of two landscapes: the landscape defined by the current 
distribution of economic activity, and the implied landscape of market potential which 
determines the future evolution of that distribution.  
Numerical simulations in that study indicate that as the agricultural frontier shifts 
outward, several lowest-order cities form before it becomes profitable for the level 2 industry 
to start production at a new location. When it does become profitable for some firms of level 2 
industry to start production at new location, it is not only to serve the agricultural population 
but also to get closer to the consumers in these lowest-order cities. In addition, the demand-
pull of the preexisting lowest-order cities generate cusps, at their locations, in the market 
potential curve for the level 2 industry. This makes it most likely that when firms of level 2 
industry start production at new location, they will do so at the location that contains a large 
concentration of level 1 firms.  
Thus, we have a process in which population growth generates a pattern of several 
small cities containing only level 1 industry, followed by a larger city that contains both 
industries, again followed by several more small cities, and so on. In general, when firms find 
it profitable to establish a new location for the production of higher-level goods, they tend to 
choose an existing lower order city, due to the demand-pull of the consumers in such cities; so 
when a higher-order city emerges, it normally does so via the upgrading of an existing lower-
order city.  
Fujita et al. (1999) acknowledged that the NEG provides no direct support for the Zipf 
distribution. Brakman et al. (1999) put cities on an equidistant circle, and manage to reproduce 
rank-size rule with microeconomic principles in a general equilibrium setting. It is essentially 
an NEG framework with congestion costs as a dispersion force. The fixed and variable costs 
depend on the number of firms. However, a consideration of the functional hierarchy of the 
cities is missing. 
In this model, we shift into reverse gear by decreasing the population. It may not be 
like rewinding a tape, because of varying degrees of aging in the population of each city. 
Consequently, for example, the original primary city may turn out to be the first to disappear 
from the map, and/or many large cities might be left only with higher-order industries, devoid 
of basic functions. More interestingly, small cities might emerge as new centers. The exact 
magnitude and speed of these unfolding events are to be investigated. Relying on the argument 
developed prior to NEG, Anas (1992) suggested hysteresis. In a declining economy, as the 
population falls, cities are abandoned at smaller sizes than the sizes at which they are born 
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during growth. This means the decline path cannot be obtained just by reversing the growth 
path in time. 
The original core-periphery model with two regions cannot be used to study the 
locational hierarchy that arises with multiple regions. Fan et al. (2000) provided a basic 
framework used in this study. We have N regions and M commodities. The total population is 
L. Consumers have the same preferences. A representative consumer in region i consumes land 
and manufactured goods with a Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖𝜃0 � 𝑐𝑚𝑖𝜃𝑚𝑀
𝑚=1
 
 (1) 
 
where 𝑐𝑚𝑖 is the composite of differentiated manufactured commodities of variety v. 
 
𝑐𝑚 = ��𝑐𝑚𝑖,𝑣𝜎𝑚−1𝜎𝑚𝑛𝑚
𝑣=1
�
𝜎𝑚
𝜎𝑚−1
 
 (2) 
 
Here, 𝜎𝑚 stands for the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of commodity m. 
As it tends to infinity, goods become close to perfect substitutes, while as it approaches 1, the 
desire to consume a greater variety increases. It can be shown that utility rises with the number 
of varieties available. The budget shares for land and the commodities satisfy 
 
𝜃0 + � 𝜃𝑚 = 1𝑀
𝑚=1
 
 (3) 
 
As with other NEG models, we need to assume that the mobile factor is used 
intensively in the increasing returns sector. Commodities are manufactured with increasing 
returns using just labor. Since a firm specializes in one and only one variety, the numbers of 
firms and varieties are identical. 
 
𝑙𝑚𝑖,𝑣 = 𝛼𝑚 + 𝑧𝑚𝑖,𝑣 
 (4) 
 
Here, 𝑙𝑚𝑖,𝑣 is the amount of labor used, and 𝛼𝑚 stands for the fixed cost. 
The transport costs take the iceberg form and differ by industry. 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑖�1 + 𝛾𝑚𝑑𝑖𝑗� 
 (5) 
 
The mill price with a mark-up charged by firms in commodity m in region i is as follows when  
𝑤𝑖 represents the marginal cost. 
 
𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝑚𝜎𝑚 − 1𝑤𝑖 
 (6) 
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The profit of a representative firm is 
 
𝜋𝑚𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 � 𝑧𝑚𝑖,𝑣𝜎𝑚 − 1 − 𝛼𝑚� 
 (7) 
 
It follows that the zero-profit output for a firm is 
 
𝑧𝑚𝑖
0 = 𝛼𝑚(𝜎𝑚 − 1) 
 (8) 
 
The equilibrium number of firms (and varieties) in region i is determined by the size of the 
total workforce and labor requirement per firm. Migration of workers across regions and 
industries is thus tantamount to industrial relocation. 
 
𝑛𝑚𝑖
0 = � 𝐿𝑚𝑖
𝛼𝑚𝜎𝑚
� (𝛹𝑚𝑙𝑖)−1 
 (9) 
 
Consumers raise income from wages, profits and land rent. Land is assumed to be 
owned equally by all consumers. The per capita income, therefore, is 
 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 + 𝜋𝑖 + 1𝐿�𝑟𝑠𝑗𝑆𝑗𝑁
𝑗=1
 
 (10) 
 
where the per capita profit is derived as 
 
𝜋𝑖 = 1𝐿𝑖 � 𝑛𝑚𝑖𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑀
𝑚=1
 
 (11) 
 
and the total rental income from land is 
 
𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑖 = 𝜃0𝑦𝑖𝐿𝑖 
 (12) 
 
The algorithm starts with setting the parameters for population distribution, regional wage 
levels and the land rental rate in a way that ensures the economy is in a long-run equilibrium. 
 
𝑟𝑠𝑖 = 𝜃0𝑦𝑖𝐿𝑖𝑆𝑖  
 (13) 
 
Now, the spending on commodity m coming from region i by the consumers and 
producers in region j is 
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𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑗 = 𝑛𝑚𝑖 𝜔𝑚𝑖 𝜇𝑚𝑖𝑗∑ 𝑛𝑚𝑘 𝜔𝑚𝑘 𝜇𝑚𝑘𝑗𝑁𝑘=1 𝐸𝑆𝑚𝑗 
 (14) 
 
where the total spending on commodity m by both consumers and producers in region j is 
 
𝐸𝑆𝑚𝑗 = 𝜃𝑚𝑦𝑗𝐿𝑗  
 
and 
 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖1−𝜎𝑚 
 
and 
 
𝜇𝑚𝑖𝑗 = �1 + 𝛾𝑚𝑑𝑖𝑗�1−𝜎𝑚 
 
Furthermore, the total demand for all varieties of commodity m produced in region i is 
 
𝐸𝐷𝑚𝑖 = �𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑁
𝑗
 
 (15) 
 
It readily follows that the demand for labor by firms making no profits in this region is 
 
𝐿𝑚𝑖
𝐷 = f𝑚𝑙𝐸𝐷𝑚𝑖
𝑤𝑖
 
 
and also 
 
𝐿𝑖
𝐷 = � 𝐿𝑚𝑖𝐷𝑀
𝑚=1
 
 (16) 
 
The wage rates gradually adjust according to 
 
𝑤𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑤�𝐿𝑖,𝑡𝐷 − 𝐿𝑖,𝑡� 
 (17) 
 
The indirect utility in region i is  
 
𝑉𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖−𝜃0 �𝑃𝑚𝑖−𝜃𝑚𝑀
𝑚=1
 
 (18) 
 
The migration of workers occurs according to 
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𝐿𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆𝐿�𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑡� �𝐿𝑖,𝑡 
 
where the average indirect utility is 
 
𝑉𝑡� = 1𝐿�𝑉𝑖,𝑡𝐿𝑖,𝑡𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 (19) 
 
Within each region, the labor moves between industries toward higher demand. In addition, in-
migrants, if any, are allocated to each industry in proportion to its zero-profit demand. 
 
𝐿𝑚𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝐿𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑚 �𝐿𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝑚𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝐿𝑖,𝑡𝐷 − 𝐿𝑚𝑖,𝑡� + �𝜆𝐿�𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑡� �𝐿𝑖,𝑡� 𝐿𝑚𝑖𝐷𝐿𝑖,𝑡𝐷  
 (20) 
 
The output level of a representative firm is 
 
𝑧𝑚𝑖,𝑣 = 𝐸𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑖 
 (21) 
 
The number of firms evolves according to 
 
𝑛𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑛𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑛𝜋𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 
 (22) 
 
Thus, this model preserves the common features of NEG models in that every pair of 
varieties is equally substitutable, welfare increases with the number of varieties, and each firm 
produces one variety, employing the same quantity of labor, charging the same price, and 
producing the same quantity. Migration among many cities makes it all the more interesting. 
 
5. Simulations 
 
 Table 1 lists a set of parameter values which makes the equilibrium shown in Table 2 
possible. Finding the appropriate values involves many rounds of educated guesses. Since 
those are the values with which the current equilibrium is attained, it does not make much 
sense to change their values except for transport costs. After checking for the consistency and 
integrity of the model by increasing spatial friction, we move on to depart from the lock-in 
state to see what population implosion would entail.  
 
Table 1: Parameter values 
 
Consumption Scale Elasticity Transport Speed 
𝜃0 0.4         
𝜃1 0.1 𝛼1 3.0 𝜎1 1.2 𝛾1 0.1 λ𝑤 0.01 
𝜃2 0.2 𝛼2 2.0 𝜎2 3.0 𝛾2 0.7 λ𝐿 0.10 
𝜃3 0.3 𝛼3 1.0 𝜎3 9.0 𝛾3 3.8 λ𝑚 0.25 
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Table 2: Populations and land areas 
 
City Total First Second Third Land 
1 2,520  515 825 1,180  304 
2 357  1 1 355 133 
3 629  1 315 313  111 
4 503  1 251 251 91 
5 1,260  501 155 604  195 
6 419  1 208 210  78 
7 839  1 421 417  138 
8 313  1 1 311  117 
 
Figure 3 shows the initial configuration which satisfies both rank-size rule and central 
place theory. Figure 4 shows the results with higher transport costs in order to verify that the 
model is correctly set up. Figure 5 displays the situation after 200 rounds of iteration. Oddly, 
they do not seem to converge to symmetry. To remove any first nature advantage, land areas 
are reallocated among the cities. The land areas could be regarded as an inherent advantage a 
region possesses like climate features and raw material, as opposed to second nature which are 
the result of human actions to improve upon the first nature. Figure 6 demonstrates that the 
space economy now fast approaches symmetry. Figure 7 shows the state at round 200, with the 
cities almost equalized in all aspects. 
We are now ready to study the population shrinkage. The rate of change is not city-
specific; rather it is deemed to depend on the current size of the city in question. We consider 
two rather extreme cases. Figure 8 traces the changes when smaller cities shrink faster (Case 
A). In each period, natural changes occur according to the schedule for different city sizes and 
then followed by social changes caused by workers roaming across cities as specified in the 
model. Two opposing forces come into play. A city with larger centripetal force would gain 
population and vice versa. A general shrinking trend is apparent, but medium-order industry 
starts spilling onto two smallest cities previously overshadowed by the primate city. Figure 9 
highlights the growing shares of the two smallest cities, while Figure 10 depicts the situation at 
round 10. How realistic is this prediction? The following excerpt provides a clue: 
 
In the decade from 2000 to 2010 Detroit lost an astonishing 25% of its population… 
There are now about 60,000 empty houses… Detroit is now incredibly cheap, and that 
has drawn some rather pioneering types back into town [including] the largest internet 
mortgage company in America… You can buy a vast Victorian town-house in a 
perfectly pleasant area for $100,000 or a loft in somewhere a bit edgier for considerably 
less.4
 
 
Now suppose population shrinks with the larger cities dwindling faster (Case B). As 
Figure 11 illustrates, the process becomes very slow as the cities become small. Figures 12 and 
13 show the city shares and their state at round 10, respectively. Nonetheless, a similar 
phenomenon occurs with the medium-order industry spreading to cities 2 and 8. In this model, 
hierarchy is partly disrupted as population shrinks. 
Then, a couple of welfare analyses are performed. Figure 14 compares the utility levels 
under three different uniform rates of natural change. Initially, lower demand for land causes 
rent to go down boosting the utility. However, illusion is short lived because the markets start 
shrinking and suppressing wages. It is also better to maintain a low pace of population decline 
                                                          
4 “The parable of Detroit: So cheap, there’s hope”, The Economist, October 22, 2011. 
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in the long-term perspective. Finally, Figure 15 presents utility with varying rates. We compare 
two cases against the fixed rate of -5%. Case B clearly outperforms in the long run, implying 
the importance of sustaining the livability of smaller cities.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Since the early 1970s, balanced growth has been at the heart of Korea’s regional 
development policy. There has been, and will be, much discussion on the very necessity and 
proper forms of so-called balanced regional growth in Korea. In the face of the unprecedented 
event of an impending depopulation, a whole new approach and shift of paradigm are 
desperately needed. In this study, we can extract a number of interesting possibilities which 
enable us to better comprehend what would happen to the existing cities when the country’s 
population starts to shrink, while deriving useful policy implications for preserving the utility 
of residents. 
People struggle against the “tyranny of distance”. In this paper, I raise the question of 
whether population shrinkage leads to changes in urban hierarchy in terms of their relative 
sizes and functions from the standpoint of the new economic geography. We have found some 
salient patterns in which small cities in the agglomeration shadow become relatively bigger as 
medium industries spill over on them. This result is quite robust against variation in the rates 
of natural change among cities. 
There are many directions this study can be improved upon. Crozet (2004) focused on 
the forward linkage of individual location choices. The high barriers to migration hinder rapid 
evolution toward a core-periphery pattern, although this is less of an issue within a country. He 
considers migration costs and employment opportunities with a stochastic component within 
the framework of the EU. Although migrants follow market potentials for firms, the centripetal 
forces are quite limited due to high mobility costs. Consideration of employment probability 
and migration cost would certainly add a more realistic flavor to the present model. 
Another meaningful direction to pursue is the agent-based microsimulation modeling. 
Fowler (2007) contrasted geographers’ criticism on the economists’ assumptions, determinism 
and dependence on analytic models against economists criticizing geographical economists for 
depending on simulation rather than analytical solutions, simplistic representation on the 
interaction between firms and lack of strong empirical evidence. He then postulates a situation 
where each firm and worker acts individually reflecting heterogeneous behavior. Most NEG 
models, including the present one, derive the number of firms in a given region from the size 
of the local labor market. It does not always have to be the case. Outside the equilibrium, firms 
and workers know the outcome of their decisions up to a point, but conditions would change as 
other firms and workers make their own decisions. After each move, if the sum of profits and 
losses is positive, an additional firm is spawned, while if it is negative, a firm will be removed. 
In other words, firms have bounded rationality, and are rewarded or dropped depending on 
their choice. 
Including intermediate goods, while closer to reality, is much more involving, and it 
would be extremely difficult to find a set of parameter values that enables the equilibrium to 
satisfy both the rank-size rule and central place hierarchy. Nonetheless, Venables (1996) 
showed that a cumulative causation by final sector firms and intermediate goods suppliers can 
lead to a core-periphery structure even without labor mobility. The firms selling poorly 
differentiated goods remain dispersed while firms supplying highly differentiated products 
leave large cities and set up in the urban shadows.  
With our model, one can also simulate and assess the impact of large-scale natural 
disasters that destroy cities and transportation networks. It can also be used to devise an 
optimal order of reconstruction that is crucial in recovering the pre-disaster level of city order 
and hierarchy. Lastly, we need to consider changing age structures in cities. Total fertility rates 
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in many regions are below the natural replacement level. Rising life expectancy means a 
higher share of the elderly population. Countries will have to reduce either the benefits of 
public pension or the coverage thereof. Decline of tax revenue and increases in the fiscal 
deficit mean negative shocks on productivity and a slowdown of economic growth. Conflicts 
among generations are thus inevitable. 
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Figure 1: Total fertility by major regions 
 
 
Source: World Population Prospects, United Nations (2010) 
 
 
Figure 2: Populations of Japan and Korea 
        
   Japan      Korea 
Source: World Population Prospects, United Nations (2010)  
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Figure 3: Initial configuration 
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Figure 4: High transport costs with given land (up to 100 rounds) 
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Figure 5: High transport costs with given land (at round 200) 
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Figure 6: High transport costs with equal land (up to 100 rounds) 
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Figure 7: High transport costs with equal land (at round 200) 
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Figure 8: Population shrinkage when small cities shrink faster (up to 30 rounds) 
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Figure 9: Population shrinkage when small cities shrink faster (city shares)  
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Figure 10: Population shrinkage when small cities shrink faster (at round 10) 
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Figure 11: Population shrinkage when large cities shrink faster (up to 30 rounds) 
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Figure 12: Population shrinkage when large cities shrink faster (city shares)  
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Figure 13: Population shrinkage when large cities shrink faster (round 10) 
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Figure 14: Utility with uniform rates 
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